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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MARIAN L. SANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, BELNAP FREIGHT
LINES, and THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND,

Case No.
10235

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is based upon a Writ of Review which
the Plaintiff obtained in this Court on September
22, 1964, and in which the Plaintiff and her attorney have requested this Court to review a decision
and .order of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case relates to the results of an accident
which occurred on January 18, 1962, in which the
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Plaintiff, Marian L. Sanderson, slipped and fell on
some stairs at the premises of her employer, Belnap
Freight Lines, Salt Lake City. In this brief, we are
defending the Industrial Commission's decision
dated July 1, 1964, in which the Commission ordered
the Defendants to pay certain medical expenses incurred by Marian L. Sanderson prior to June 13,
1962, and workmen's compensation to and including
February 12, 1962, and in which the Commission
denied any payments for any later periods. R. 141)
We agree partly with the statement of facts
contained in the Brief of Plaintiff, but that statement contains considerable argument and inferences
which we feel are not justified or proper. It would
probably clarify the situation if we here set out the
basic facts without any inferences or argumentation.
On April 4, 1963, applicant's attorney, Mr.
Farr, sent a letter to the Industrial Commission,
which was in the nature of an application for benefits to his client, Marian L. Sanderson, relating to
her accident of January 18, 1962 in the employ of
Belnap Freight Lines. (R. 17) As the workmen's
compensation insurer of Belnap, the State Insurance Fund had already paid for Mrs. Sanderson
certain amounts of medical and hospital expense and
had paid her workmen's compensation at the rate
of $41.75 per week from January 21 to January
30, 1962, and from February 5 to February 12, 1962
inclusive. The Fund also later paid all bills for her
treatment during the entire period from January
18, 1962 to June 13, 1962.
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On April 15, 1963, the Industrial Commission
referred the medical aspects of the case to a Medical
Panel consisting of Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Dr. W.
E. Hess and Dr. L. N. Ossman. (R. 21) The Panel
made its first report to the Industrial Commission
in its letter of July 17, 1963. (R. 32-36)
On August 8, 1963, applicant's attorney sent
to the Commission a letter (R. 41-43), containing
objections to said Panel's report. He also requested
the Commission to appoint on the Panel a neurologist and a medical doctor specializing in internal
medicine.
On August 12, 1963, the Industrial Commission
returned the case to the Medical Panel and added
to the panel Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, a neurologist,
and Dr. Alan E. Lindsay, an internal medicine specialist. ( R. 44)
The Medical Panel, now consisting of five physicians, specialists in their fields, made its report to
the Industrial Commission on October 18, 1963. (R.
57-59) This Panel report was objected to by Mrs.
Sanderson's attorney in his letter to the Industrial
Commission dated November 21, 1963. (R. 45-47)
The Industrial Commission held a formal hearing on
February 10, 1964. (R. 69-137) The Commission
then rendered its decision in the form of an order
dated July 1, 1964. (R. 140-141) The Plaintiff appealed from the Order of the Commission.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION DENYING APPLICANT'S CLAIM FOR
COMPENSATION BENEFITS AFTER JUNE 13,
1962, AND DENYING HER CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FOR PERMANENT PARTIAL
DISABILITY, WAS PROPER AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
In paragraph 3 of his Petition for Writ of
Review, Plaintiff's attorney charged that the Industrial Commission's order of July 1, 1964 (1) failed
to resolve the issues; ( 2) did not rate the Plaintiff
for permanent partial disability; ( 3) limited the
liability of the employer to the period of time ending
June 13, 1962; and ( 4) denied claimant any further
compensation.
The Commission did "resolve the issues." Some
of them were resolved in favor of applicant's claim;
and some of them were resolved against her claim.
The Plaintiff by her appeal objects to those parts
of the Commission's order which resolved certain
issues against her claim.
The Commission's decision of July 1, 1964, (R.
140), recited the Medical Panel's actions and findings and conclusions in the case, and then said, (R.
141):
The Commission accepts the Panel report.
The Commission concludes that applicant
should receive compensation for time lost from
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work because of the injury to and including
June 13, 1962, and that all related medical
and hospital bills to and including June 13,
1962 should be paid by carrier. She should not
be rated for permanent partial disability because there is no objective evidence of permanent disability as a result of the accident.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
defendants pay applicant temporary total
compensation at the rate of $41.75 per week
from January 21, 1962 to February 12, 1962,
if not already paid, and all medical and hospital bills to and including the 13th day of June,
1962.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any
claim at this time for permanent partial disability because of the injury to the back is and
same is hereby denied.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the foregoing decision and order of the Commission. (R. 140-141) Both Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson
and Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, who testified at the Commission's hearing, (R. 72-107), were members of
the Medical Panel which had made its report to the
Commission dated October 18, 1963, and which was
received by the Commission on November 5, 1963.
(R. 57-59)
Reference was made in Plaintiff's brief (PB-8)
to the testimony of Dr. Hebertson, ·a member of the
Panel, that Applicant had a 5.7'o·loss of bodily function as far as her arm was concerned. It is submitted
that a fair reading of the testimony of Dr. Hebert-
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son (R-80-81) will show that the doctor was referring only to the subjective complaints of the Plaintiff, and that objectively he did not find any permanent partial disability.
Dr. Hebertson testified ( R. 80) that there was
no objective evidence of loss of function of Mrs.
Sanderson's central or peripheral nervous system,
which might have been the result of her injuries of
January 18 ,1962. That also was substantially one
of the findings and conclusions contained in the
Panel report. (R. 59)
Dr. Hebertson testified in answering Mr. Farr's
questions, (R. 80-81):

Q. Was there any subjective evidence?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the subjective evidence?
A. The pain which was present over the
patient's head and neck, her decreasing grip
in the left hand, and the loss of feeling over
the left side of the face and left upper extremity.
Q. Any other evidence, sir?
A. I don't think so.
Q. As far as objective and subjective evidence, is one any more valid than the other in
determining the disability?
A. I think so. Objective evidence is ~~
ways more valid than subjective evidence In
determining disability.
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At R. 84, Mr. Farr further questioned Dr. Hebertson:
Q. Has there been any significant loss of
function of arm or hand of Mrs. Sanderson?
A. Yes. Subjectively, yes.
Q. To what extent, sir?
A. Again that is purely subjective, or
purely on the part of the patient, and I could
not determine it. I would have to accept her
word purely in that regard, because objectively I can find no loss of function in the extremity.
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, an M.D. specializing in
orthopedic surgery, who was the chairman of the
Medical Panel in this case, testified regarding the
procedure of .the Panel in performing its functions
under the provisions of Section 35-1-77 of the Workmen's Compensation Law. (R. 93) The Referee
(Commissioner Wiesley), asked him:
Q. Now tell us your procedure in getting
together.
A. When I receive one of these Panels, I
review the entire record and make up a summary of all the pertinent factors from the record. If it appears that there are any reports
that are not present in the record, any doctors
that have seen the patient from whom we do
not have reports, or any other information
that we can detect might have a bearing on
it, we attempt to obtain all of this information. In addition we obtain all of the X-rays
that can be obtained that had been taken on
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the case. Then this information is all summarized. The X-rays, the Industrial Commission
file and the summary are sent to each Panel
member prior to the meetings, so that he can
review them and become acquainted with the
case. The applicant is then called in. We, before examining the applicant, go over all of
the previous material. The applicant is then
interviewed. That is a history is taken regarding their entire story, involving their alleged
accident and the symptoms, and the treatment,
and the applicant is then examined. Following that the Panel then goes over the findings,
and reaches the conclusions. The report is then
typed up, sent - or taken, actually taken to each Panel member individually, for his
signature.
In answering Mr. Farr's questions on crossexamination, (R. 96-97), Dr. Holbrook testified regarding the occasions when the members of the Medical Panel made examinations of Mrs. Sanderson's
head and neck and back, etc. :

Q. Now did you examine Marian Sanderson, doctor?
A. Yes. Well, I should say that I did not
personally examine Marian Sanderson. * * *
I was present at both of the examinations.
These are done each time with all as previously described. All of the members of the Panel
examined the patient together. * * *Obviously
every member of the Panel does not perform
every examination test. They are done as a
group examination, and I was a part of the
group that examined Mrs. Sanderson on two
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occasions. * * * As Chairman, the various portions of this examination were delegated to
the specialists involved, and I acted as r~cord
er, writing d?wn the findings and the history
that we obtained.
Plaintiff has taken the position that the Commission, in following the findings of the Medical
Panel, acted arbitrarily and in excess of its powers.
It is claimed throughout Plaintiff's Brief that the
report of the Medical Panel should be considered as
only an "exhibit" and not as evidence.
Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., 1953 in providing for
the Medical Panel and in setting forth the procedure
to be followed if objections to the findings of the
Panel are made is as follows:
If objections to such report are filed it
shall be the duty of the Commission to set the
case for hearing within thirty days to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such
hearing any party so desiring may request the
Commission to have the Medical Panel or any
of its members present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. Upon such
hearing the written report of the panel may
be received as an exhibit but shall not be considered as evidence in the case except insofar
as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.
In this case Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, who had been
appointed Chairman of the Medical Panel to investigate the medical aspects involved, was present at
the hearing held on February 10, 1964 and was
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called upon to testify. Dr. Holbrook identified the
signatures on the panel report (R. 92, 103, 104). He
then explained how the Panel proceeded to determine
the medical aspects of the case ( R. 93). His testimony has been set out in full earlier in this brief.
Upon cross-examination by counsel he explained in
detail the examination \vhich was made of the medical reports and of the applicant, the Plaintiff herein,
(R. 94-103). Later, in response to questioning by
counsel for the State Insurance Fund, he testified
as follows relative to the Panel report:

Q. And you concurred and agreed with
the other doctors that the statements of the
facts specified in this report and the conclusions which you arrived at - particularly
those set out in the latter part of the report
- are your opinions and findings?
A. I concur with these, yes.
Q. And you still have that same opinion?
A. I do.
The above quoted portion of Section 35-1-77,
U.C.A., 1953, sets forth that the Medical Panel report shall be received "as an exhibit, but shall not
be considered as evidence in the case except insofar
as it is sustained by the testimony admitted." The
testimony of Dr. Holbrook, as Chairman of the Panel,
upon the careful examination of him by Plaintiff's
counsel and by counsel for the State Insurance Fund,
did sustain the contents of the Medical Panel report,
particularly the findings thereof, and that the report having been sustained by the testimony of the
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doctors, the Medical Panel report became and was
properly considered as evidence by the Commission.
Dr. Hebertson also testified to the same effect (R.
72, 87).
Plaintiff's brief cites the case of Hackjord vs.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 358 P. 2d. 899, 11
U. 2d. 312, in support of the argument that neither
the Commission nor the employer introduced the testimony required by Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., 1953
as amended. In the Hack ford case, although the members of the Medical Panel were present at the hearing none of them were examined, either by the Commission or by counsel for either party. In that case
the Panel report was not sustained by competent
evidence. The facts in this case are entirely different. The Chairman of the Medical Panel was present,
he was examined by the referee, very carefully crossexamined by Plaintiff's attorney, and further examined by counsel for the State Insurance Fund. His
testimony fully sustained the findings and conclusions of the Medical Panel. Dr. Hebertson who was
also a member of the Medical Panel was present and
testified. The Commission strived earnestly to provide Plaintiff with a complete study of the medical
aspects of her claim. Following the report of the
original Medical Panel, and at the request of Plaintiff's attorney, two additional physicians were appointed to the Panel, Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, a
neurologist and Dr. Allen E. Lindsay, an internist.
This enlarged Panel then made its report to the Commission and found as follows:
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( 1) This applicant's hospitalization on

18 January 1962 was made necessary by this
accident. This accident. resulted in temporary
loss of control of her diabetes and care of her
diabetes during this period of hospitalization
was made necessary by this accident. The relationship of her diabetes to this accident
ceased at the time of her discharge from the
hospital and the subsequent course and care of
her diabetes since that time is not related to
this accident.
The Panel's findings in that paragraph were
entirely in favor of the Plaintiff. In the next four
paragraphs of its report the Panel found that:
( 2) This applicant follows the natural
history of most diabetics and appears to follow the normal course of diabetes for her.
There is no evidence of aggravation of her
diabetic process as a result of this accident.
(3) Total temporary disability as aresult of this accident ceased when she returned
to work initially following this accident.
( 4) There is no objective evidence of
permanent disability as a result of this accident.
(5) No further treatment is indicated
as a result of this accident.
It is well established that conflicts in the evidence must be resolved by the Commission as stated
in Norris vs. Industrial Commission, 90 U. 256, 261,
61 P. 2d. 413:
Again, therefore, we have the old case of
a conflict of evidence which it is for the Commission to resolve.
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It was for the Commission to resolve the conflict in the evidence in this case. That it chose to
accept the conclusions of the Medical Panel was not
capricious or arbitrary. The members of the Panel
were specialists in their fields, and the Commission
chose to believe the testimony of the Panel doctors
and report of the Panel.
POINT 2
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS
NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED TO FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT MARIAN SANDERSON'S
TREATMENT FOR HER DIABETIC CONDITION AFTER JUNE 13, 1962, WAS NECESSITATED BY HER ACCIDENT OF JANUARY 18,
1962.
Basically the same situation exists in the case
at bar, as has existed in a number of other cases
which have been decided by this Court. One of the
most recent was the case of Burton vs. Ind. Comm.,
13 Utah 2d 353, 374 P. 2d 439, which had many elements of simila~ity to the procedural situation existing in our present (Sanderson) case. Mr. Burton
worked as an employee delivering beer. On the morning of October 30, 1959, after he had made his second delivery in downtown Salt Lake City and returned to his truck, he felt a severe pain in his chest.
He went into the nearby Judge Building, where a
doctor gave him some emergency treatment, and then
called his family doctor, T. A. Clawson. Mr. Burton
was taken to a hospital, where he died that after-
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noon, from coronary occlusion. After hearings by
the Industrial Commission, and proceedings by a
medical panel, the Commission denied the claim of
Mrs. Burton, on the basis that the death did notresult from an industrial accident. The Supreme Court
of Utah upheld the Commission's denial. In the
Court's opinion, among other things it said:
In order to reverse the finding and order
made the plaintiff must show that there is
such credible uncontradicted evidence in her
favor that the Commission's refusal to so find
was capricious and arbitrary. * * * * She relies upon the circumstances of the death described above, coupled with the testimony of
the family physician, Dr. Clawson. In response to the question as to whether the deceased's exertion in lifting and delivering the
cases of beer was a contributing cause to the
occurrence to Mr. Burton's heart attack and
his death, the doctor answered that, "it could
be a factor.''
As opposed to the evidence upon which
plaintiff relied the Commission had before it
the opinions of three members of the medical
panel, together with the testimony of one of
them, Dr. L. E. Viko, a well-known heart specialist. The substance of their opinions was
that lVIr. Burton's coronary thrombosis with
myocardial infarction was not caused by t~e
exertion of his work that morning. In its decision the Commission recited, ''We chose to believe the testimony of Dr. L. E. Viko and the
panel report.''
Assuming without deciding that the
plaintiff's evidence would be sufficient to sus-
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tain a finding in her favor, it is indisputable
that the testimony just referred to is sufficient
to sustain a finding to the contrary. There being no basis upon which this court could say
that the Commission acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably in denying the application, its order is affirmed.
Another case which involved the Industrial
Commission's acceptance of one side of a conflict in
the medical opinion evidence in the case, was Woodburn vs. Ind. Comm., 111 Utah 393, 181 P. 2d 209.
Paul Woodburn was employed as superintendent on
the ski-lift construction job at Snow Basin. On July
21, 1945 he rode a tractor to the upper terminal
point, then he walked down the mountain to the lower terminal. When he arrived there, apparently he
suffered a slight heart attack. For the next ten days
he supervised the job from the lower level. On July
31st he did some climbing on the hill. Shortly afterwards he had severe pain under the breastbone. After
a hearing and rehearing, the Commission denied Mr.
Woodburn's claim. The Commission concluded that
his coronary occlusion "was not caused by an accident arising out of or in the course of" his employment. In sustaining the Commission's decision, the
Supreme Court of Utah (p. 396), referred to the expert medical testimony before the Commission. The
medical testimony from four doctors was divided
with respect to their opinions of the possible causation between the exertion and the heart attack. At
page 399 of the Court's opinion, it quoted from a
previous Utah case, Loran~ge vs. Ind. Comm., 107
Utah 261, 152 P. 2d 272:
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Unless therefore it can be said, upon the
whole re~ord, .. that the. ~o1nmi~sion ~learly
acted arbitrarily or capriciously In making its
findings and decision, this court is powerless
to interfere. * * * * It was not intended, * * * *
that this court, in matters of evidence, should
to any extent substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the Commission.
and at page 400 of the Court's opinion:
There is substantial competent evidence
(supplied by Drs. Walker and Olson) that in
this case plaintiff's injury was not caused
or contributed to by the physical effort he put
forth on his job. The Commission, therefore,
did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining such to be the case.
It should be kept in mind that the burden of
proof is upon the applicant to establish her claim.
Grasteit vs. Ind. Comm., 76 Utah 487, 290 Pac. 764;
Wherritt vs. Ind. Comm., 100 Utah 68, 110 P. 2d.
374.
In the case of Kent vs. Ind. Comm., 89 Utah
381, 57 P. 2d 724, pages 384-385 of the Court's opinion contains the following language:
When the Industrial Commission denies
compensation and the case is brought to this
court for review, a different type of search
of the record is demanded than when the Industrial Commission makes an award of compensation and the record is likewise brought
here for review.
In the denial of compensation, the record
must disclose that there is material, substan-
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tial, competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the
conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily · and capriciously disregarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to believe such evidence.
With respect to the letter (R. 162-164), which
Dr. A. F. Martin sent to Lionel M. Farr on June 18,
1964; relating to Dr. Martin's examination of Marian L. Sanderson on April 21, 1964, and a copy of
which letter Mr. Farr attached to his Petition for
Writ of Review (R. 169); that letter is not properly
a part of the Industrial Commission's record in this
case, nor a proper part of the record now before the
Supreme Court.
At the end of the Industrial Commission's hearing on Feb. 10, 1964 (R. 136), the applicant's attorney said, "That's all." The defendants' attorney said,
"That's all." The referee then said, "The Commission will take it under advisement." Nobody asked
to be allowed to submit additional evidence. The case
apparently was submitted by all parties for the Commission's decision.
Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953, provides that
when a case is brought to the Supreme Court for
review.
No new or additional evidence may be
introduced in such Court, but the cause shall
be heard on the record of the commission as
certified by it.
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The above mentioned letter from Dr. Martin to
Mr. Farr, is certainly new and additional evidence.
If that letter were considered to be part of the Industrial Commission's record, there would never be
an end to a hearing. After an applicant has had a
hearing by the Industrial Commission and the case
has been submitted for the Commission's decision,
if the applicant and her attorney feel that their case
would be strengthened by some additional evidence,
do they have the right to obtain further examinations or to obtain further statements or other evidence and to merely mail such additional evidence
to the Industrial Commission, without having given
any notice to the defendants and without having
given the defendants any opportunity to cross examine? The mere asking of the question shows the
fallacy of such procedure.
At the hearing on February 10, 1964, the Industrial Commission properly accepted evidence relating to the applicant's accident of January 18,
1962, and the evidence relating to her condition and
treatment prior to the day the hearing was being
held. The issues which were at that time before the
Industrial Commission involved questions as to
whether the periods of te1nporary disability of Marian Sanderson from January 18, 1962 to January
30, 1962, and from February 5, 1962 to February
12, 1962, and from June 15, 1962 to July 4, 1962,
and from December 8, 1962 to February 2, 1963, and
from April 4, 1963 to May 20, 1963, (R. 130), were
chargeable to her accident of January 18, 1962, or
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whether they were periods of disability caused by
her diabetic condition.
The Medical Panel's report (R. 57-59) and the
Industrial Commission's decision (R. 140-141) decided that the first two periods of her disability,
namely January 18, 1962 to January 30, 1962 and
February 5, 1962 to February 12, 1962, were chargeable to the accident of January 18, 1962. But the
Panel and the Commission also decided that the later
periods: commencing June 15, 1962 and ending May
20, 1963, were not chargeable to her accident of
January 18, 1962. The Panel and the Commission
also decided that Marian Sanderson did not have
any permanent disability chargeable to the accident.
The Industrial Commission's determination of those
points in issue, related to the time when the hearing
was being held (February 10, 1964) and to all
periods prior to that date.
If the applicant (Plaintiff) claims that her condition changed after the date of the hearing, it may
be that she can invoke the Industrial Commission's
"continuing jurisdiction" at some time in the future,
under the provisions of Section 35-1-78 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, and have the Commission
consider such a claim for additional benefits. But
the case which is now being reviewed by the Supreme
Court of Utah involves only the record relating to
Marian Sanderson's condition at the time of the hearing on February 10, 1964 and prior thereto. The
medical report of Dr. A. F. Martin ( R. 163) , is not
a proper part of the record of this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision and order of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed
by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah
CHARLES WELCH, JR.,
922 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
F. A. TROTTIER,
1660 Garfield Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
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